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ABSTRACT
Prior studies in Malaysia indicate that fair value of investment properties are not value relevant in various industries. 
Unlike those industries, Malaysian Real Estate Investment Trusts (MREITs) is a capital-intensive industry where the 
investment properties made up the majority of the MREITs total assets. Furthermore this industry is subjected to stringent 
monitoring by the Securities Commission (SC) which requires MREITs to adopt the fair value model and revalue their 
investment properties for at least once in every three years. Therefore, results from previous studies cannot be generalized 
to this industry. Hence, this study investigates whether fair value on investment properties is value relevant in the MREIT 
industry. It also examines the effect of board characteristics on the share prices of MREITs. Secondary data was obtained 
from annual reports of twelve listed MREITs on Bursa Malaysia from 2006 to 2011 and analyzed using multiple regression 
analysis. The results indicate that the information on the fair value of investment properties (as presented in balance 
sheet) is significantly related to share price of MREITs. However, the changes in fair value (revaluation surplus), as 
presented in income statement is not significantly related to the share price. The findings suggest that only fair value of 
investment properties (FVIP) is useful for investors to make their investment decisions. This study also found a positive 
and significant association between board independence and share prices of MREITs. It indicates that independence of 
directors in MREIT firms is also important to investors that it is reflected in the share price. This study adds to the limited 
literature on MREITs. The results indicate that investors do value the fair value information provided by MREITs and 
support the fair value accounting in REITs. The findings of this study could be used by regulators in improving the future 
revaluation guidelines for the REIT industry.
Keywords: Value relevance; fair value on investment properties; board characteristics; Malaysian Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (MREITs)
INTRODUCTION
This study examines the value relevance of fair value of 
investment property and board characteristics in Malaysian 
real estate investment trust (MREIT) industry. Unlike 
other industries, MREITs industry is not only subjected 
to Malaysian Financial Reporting Standards (MFRS) 
140 Investment Property (which is in line with IAS 40 
Investment Property) but is also subjected to additional 
requirement issued by the Security Commission (SC). 
While MFRS 140 allows firms to measure their entire class 
of investment properties either at cost or fair value, the 
Guidelines on Real Estate Investment issued by SC requires 
all listed MREITs industry to revalue their investment 
portfolio once every three years (clause 10.03). 
 The additional requirement of MREITs is a unique 
feature that made results of prior studies within other 
industries and jurisdictions (such as Owusu-Ansah & 
Yeoh 2006; So & Smith 2009; Lourenco & Curto 2008; 
Pappu & Devi 2011; Ishak, Saringat, Ibrahim & Wahab 
2012) might not be applicable to MREITs industry. The 
revaluation of investment properties may reduce the 
opportunistic behaviour among managers and less 
information asymmetry between managers and investors. 
The additional requirement may help the SC to protect the 
investors and at the same time facilitate the development of 
MREITs industry. However, studies on the value relevance 
of fair value of investment properties in REITs are limited 
and almost non-existent in Malaysia. This is due to the 
industry being at its infancy stage as MREITs are only 
actively traded or listed on Bursa Malaysia since 2005 
and their numbers are small compared to REITs in other 
countries. Therefore results from previous studies in other 
countries might not reflect Malaysian environment. Studies 
on value relevance of fair value of investment property in 
Malaysia are limited to the property industry (Pappu & 
Devi 2011; Ishak et al. 2012). In addition, prior studies 
(Lourenco & Curto 2008; Owusu-Ansah & Yeoh 2006; 
So & Smith 2009; Ishak et al. 2012; Pappu & Devi 2011) 
provide mixed results. Similar value relevance study in 
new context is therefore necessary to provide further 
understanding on what information is deemed as relevant 
by investors. 
 Although MREITs are only required to revalue their 
investment properties once in every three years, they may 
also choose to conduct revaluations more regularly at their 
own discretion. Initial investigation indicates majority of 
MREITs voluntarily revalue their investment properties 
more than once in every three years. This could be due to 
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several factors such as to enhance the performance of the 
trust, signal additional borrowing capacity, avoid violation 
of debt covenant and achieve transparent reporting. Good 
corporate governance practices may also motivate MREITs 
to revalue their investment properties more often than what 
is required by the Guidelines on REITs. According to the 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2012 (Securities 
Commission Malaysia 2012), disclosure or transparency 
are both essential for informed decision-making. Therefore, 
firms with stronger corporate governance mechanisms are 
more likely to provide timely and accurate information to 
protect their investors’ interests. 
 Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) are often seen 
as having stronger governance mechanisms due to their 
transparency (Shakir 2009). These mechanisms can prevent 
management level corruption and enhance shareholders’ 
value by minimizing the conflict of interest between the 
agents and the principals (Samontaray 2010). Among 
corporate governance practices, board characteristics are 
considered important. This is due to the ability of board 
to influence top management to provide more transparent 
and non-misleading accounting information (Johari Mohd-
Saleh, Jaffar & Hassan 2008). Hence, this study also aims 
to provide evidence on the role of board characteristics 
(i.e. board independence and CEO duality) in investment 
decision making. Therefore, the objective of this study is 
to examine the value relevance of investment property’s 
fair value, board independence and CEO duality of MREITs.
 The study is motivated by: first, limited study on fair 
value accounting in REITs, where most of prior studies on 
fair value revaluation of investment property focused on 
other industries. The findings from the literature cannot be 
generalized to MREITs. Second, the Guidelines on REITs 
that mandatorily require MREITs to revalue their investment 
properties at least once every three years provide a unique 
setting for this study to assess the impact of revaluations 
on the share prices of MREITs. Third, this study focuses 
on Malaysian REITs because most of the prior literature 
regarding REITs focused on developed countries (example 
Bauer, Eichholtz & Kok 2010; Ghosh & Sirmans 2003; 
Han 2006; Hartzell, Sun & Titman 2006). Little attention 
has been given to emerging REITs such as MREITs (Pham 
2012). MREITs should receive more research attention as 
they showed impressive growth and outperformed most 
REITs in Asia Pacific. The market capitalisation of MREITs 
in 2013 is RM35 billion and the industry is expected to 
generate RM47 billion to the Malaysian’s GDP in 2014 
(Ministry of Finance Malaysia 2013). Currently, MREITs 
are ranked fourth in terms of market capitalization in the 
Asian Pacific region (Kaur 2013). In Malaysia, the REIT 
industry made up 28% of the total listed property equity 
on Bursa Malaysia. 
 Our findings indicate that the information on the fair 
value on investment property (as presented in balance 
sheet) is significantly related to the share price of MREITs. 
However, the changes in fair value (revaluation surplus), 
as presented in income statement is not significantly related 
to the share price. This study also found a positive and 
significant association between board independence and 
share prices of MREITs. 
 This paper is organised as follows. The next section 
discusses on the background of MREITs and the Securities 
Commission’s Guidelines on REITs. This is followed by 
the literature review and hypothesis development. The 
fourth section explains the research methodology used in 
this study. Research results are presented and discussed in 
section five. Finally, section six concludes the article. 
BACKGROUND
MALAYSIAN REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS (MREITS)
Real estate investment trusts (REITs) are unit trust schemes 
that invest primarily in income-generating real estate such 
as office buildings, commercial buildings, residences, 
shopping malls, hospitals and lands. The main source of 
income of REITs is the rental income received from tenants. 
The rental income is then distributed to the unit-holders 
of REITs as dividends. Due to the stable flow of income, 
REITs are considered as a low risk investment for investors 
(Alias & Soi Tho 2011). They provide an opportunity for 
small investors to invest in quality large-scale commercial 
real estate without having to buy the properties directly 
(Bursa Malaysia 2012). 
 In Malaysia, the development of REITs started with 
the introduction of Listed Property Trust (LPT) in 1989. 
The first LPT listed on Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
(KLSE) in August 1989, Arab Malaysia First Property 
Trust, was the first LPT in Asia (Alias & Soi Tho 2011). 
However up until year 2005, there were only four LPTs 
listed on KLSE, namely Arab-Malaysian First Property 
Trust, Mayban Property Trust Fund One, First Malaysia 
Property Trust and Amanah Harta Tanah PNB (Sing, Ho & 
Mak 2002). The slow growth in LPT industry was due to 
poor regulatory framework and structural factor such as 
lack of tax transparency (Newell, Ting, & Acheampong 
2002). 
 In January 2005, LPTs in Malaysia have been renamed 
as REITs following the issuance of Guidelines on REITs 
by the Securities Commission Malaysia to supersede the 
Guidelines on Property Trust Funds (PTFs). This effort is to 
accelerate the growth, and promote the competitiveness of 
MREITs locally and internationally (Securities Commission 
Malaysia 2005). The new Guidelines on REITs have 
major improvements from the old Guidelines on Property 
Trust Funds. The improvements include liberalization 
of the borrowing limit of MREITs, relaxation of rules on 
acquisitions of leasehold properties, flexibility in the 
acquisition of real estate that is encumbered by financial 
charges, enhancement of reporting requirements which is 
consistent with international standards (Hamzah, Rozali & 
Tahir 2010). Basically, the Guidelines on REITs oversee the 
establishment of REITs and cover areas such as appointment 
of trustee, management of company, valuation, reporting 
and audit, fees and expenses, related party transactions and 
other operational matters (Securities Commission Malaysia 
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2011). In August 2008, the Guidelines on REITs have been 
revised to govern MREITs more effectively. 
 Currently, there are 16 REITs listed on Bursa Malaysia. 
Out of the 16 listed MREITs, only Amanah Harta Tanah PNB 
was converted from a LPT. Other 15 REITs were established 
since 2005. Most of the MREITs invest in office buildings 
and commercial malls (retail). There are also MREITs that 
invest in hotels, hospital and plantation. MREITs are given 
full exemption on income tax if they distribute 90% of their 
total income to the unit holders (2012 Budget Commentary 
and Tax Information 2011). This tax incentive aims to 
further promote the REITs industry in Malaysia. Table 1 
reports all MREITs listed on Bursa Malaysia, their listing 
dates and types of assets.
FAIR VALUE REVALUATION OF INVESTMENT PROPERTIES
The fair value of an investment property is defined as 
“the price at which the property could be exchanged 
between knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm’s length 
transaction” (Malaysian Accounting Standards Board 
2011, para 36). The fair value model that reflects the 
market value of investment property is said to be more 
relevant than the historical cost model for investors to 
make economic decisions. Although there were arguments 
on the reliability of fair value of investment property, it 
should not be an issue because valuations are conducted 
by external valuers (Securities Commission Malaysia 
2011). According to Dietrich, Harris and Muller III 
(2001) the engagement of external valuers enhances the 
reliability of the fair value of investment property.
 In Malaysia, MREITs are subjected to the Guidelines 
on REITs issued by the Securities Commission Malaysia. 
The first guideline on REITs was introduced in January 
2005, which superseded the Guidelines on Property Trust 
Funds. The latest revision of Guidelines on REITs was 
issued in August 2008, and is currently used to govern 
MREITs. These guidelines require MREITs to revalue their 
investment properties at least once every three years 
(Securities Commission Malaysia 2011). However, the 
guidelines allow REITs to revalue more frequently to suit 
the changes in fair value of their investment properties. 
An investigation conducted in this study indicates that 
some of MREITs voluntarily revalued their investment 
properties more than once in every three years. This can 
be due to several reasons such as to avoid violations 
of debt covenants and to achieve transparent reporting 
(Missonier-Piera 2007). Higher disclosure has been found 
to relate to governance structure. If this is so, it is expected 
that good governance may lead to the information on fair 
value disclosed to be more reliable and trustable. If this 
is so, investors will react to governance mechanism of 
the company and reflected in share price.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND MREITS
Separation between managers and the owners of the firm 
may create conflict between them (Jensen & Meckling 
1976). Therefore an effective monitoring mechanism on 
the management is necessary to ensure the shareholders’ 
interests are guaranteed (Johari et al. 2008). One of the 
mechanisms that has been practiced by companies is good 
corporate governance. According to Yasser, Entebang 
and Mansor (2011), corporate governance is “the mode 
through which entities are managed and governed”. The 
main objective of corporate governance is to enhance 
the accountability, transparency, fairness, disclosure and 
responsibility of all businesses (Malik 2012). Therefore, 
a good, sound and healthy corporate governance policy 
is an important criterion for making investment decision 
(Samontaray 2010).
 During the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and 1998, 
many investors lost confidence in capital market and 
shied away from making investments for fear of losing 
TABLE 1. REITs listed on Bursa Malaysia
REIT LISTING DATE ASSET TYPE
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
Amanah Harta Tanah PNB*
Axis REIT
Starhill REIT
UOA REIT
Tower REIT
Al-Aqar KPJ REIT
Hektar REIT
AMFirst REIT
Quill Capita Trust
Al-Hadharah Boustead REIT
Amanahraya REIT
Atrium REIT
Sunway REIT
CapitaMalls Malaysia Trust
Pavilion REIT
IGB REIT
28/12/1990
3/8/2005
16/12/2005
30/12/2005
12/4/2006
10/8/2006
4/12/2006
20/12/2006
8/1/2007
8/2/2007
26/2/2007
2/4/2007
8/7/2010
16/7/2010
7/12/2011
21/9/2012
Office
Office, Industrial
Hotel, Residences
Office
Office
Hospital
Retail
Office
Diversified
Plantation
Diversified
Industrial
Retail/hotel/office
Retail
Retail
Retail 
Source: Extracted from Bursa Malaysia (2012)
*Established as Property Trust Funds (PTFs), and converted to REITs since August 2005
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money. Since then, Securities Commission Malaysia 
has undertaken numerous initiatives to restore investors’ 
confidence, one of which was the issuance of the Malaysian 
Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) to strengthen the 
corporate governance framework (Securities Commission 
Malaysia 2012). The MCCG provides recommendations 
on good corporate governance practices for Malaysian 
firms. Although the observance of MCCG by companies 
is voluntary, all listed companies (including MREITs) are 
however required to report their compliance with the MCCG 
in their annual reports (Securities Commission Malaysia 
2012). 
 Studies of corporate governance in REITs are becoming 
more relevant as international property investment flows 
are increasingly allocated through indirect property 
investment vehicles such as REITs rather than directly into 
property investments (Bauer et al. 2010). Many countries 
have introduced REITs to facilitate capital flows to the 
real estate sector (Bauer et al. 2010). Thus, part of the 
objective of this study is to examine the value relevance of 
corporate governance mechanisms of MREITs as corporate 
governance is one of the important determinants of share 
price (Malik 2012).
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
VALUE RELEVANCE STUDIES ON FAIR VALUE OF 
INVESTMENT PROPERTY
Value relevance research investigates the usefulness of 
accounting information to investors for making investment 
decisions. Accounting information is denoted as ‘value 
relevant’ if there a statistical association between the 
accounting information and market value of equity 
(Beisland 2009). Many value relevance studies have been 
conducted to examine the association between market 
value and accounting information such as inventory 
accounting treatment (Biddle & Lindahl 1982), intangible 
assets (Aboody & Lev 1998), choice of depreciation (Kang 
& Zhao 2009) and fair value of financial instruments 
(Hassan & Mohd-Saleh 2010) . 
  Although many studies have used value relevance 
in examining various aspects of accounting information, 
the value relevance studies on fair value of investment 
properties remain limited (Ishak et al. 2012). The first value 
relevance study on investment property has been carried 
out by Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2006) in New Zealand. 
Prior to the introduction of IAS 40 Investment Property on 
1 January 2005, the New Zealand SSAP No.17 Accounting 
for Investment Properties and Properties Intended for Sale 
allowed New Zealand companies to recognize unrealized 
gains or losses either in the income statement or in the 
revaluation reserve account. Since the IAS 40 came into 
effect, it eliminates the option of recognizing unrealized 
gains in the revaluation reserve. Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh 
(2006) examined the relative value relevance of two 
alternative accounting treatments for unrealized gains 
on investment properties using a sample of New Zealand 
companies from 1990 to 1999 when the option was is still 
available. They found that recognizing unrealized gains 
in the income statement (as required by the IAS 40) is not 
superior to recognition in the revaluation reserve account 
in terms of their value relevance. 
 So and Smith (2009) extended Owusu-Ansah and 
Yeoh’s (2006) study to the similar situations in Hong Kong. 
Prior to 1 January 2005, Hong Kong accounting standards 
(HKAS) SSAP 13 (2000) Accounting for Investment 
Properties required companies to present the changes in 
fair value of investment property in the revaluation reserve 
account. After HKAS has become fully converged with 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on 1 
January 2005, HKAS 40 which follows IAS 40 Investment 
Property requires all changes in the fair value of investment 
property to be presented in the income statement. Hence, 
So and Smith (2009) investigates the value relevance of 
revaluation method required by the old SSAP 13 (2000) and 
the revaluation method allowed under HKAS 40. Based on 
2004 to 2006 data of a sample of listed property companies 
in Hong Kong, their results showed higher market reaction 
and returns when companies presented the changes in fair 
value of investment property in the income statement. 
So and Smith (2009) support the decision usefulness of 
information presented in accordance to the IFRS. The 
inconsistent results in the above studies could be due to the 
different degree of development in their financial markets. 
Therefore examining the same issue within Malaysian 
context might be relevant to provide additional information 
within the current literature. 
 Lourenco and Curto (2008) investigated the value 
relevance of cost model and fair value model for 
investment property in four European countries, namely 
France, Germany, Sweden and the UK. They focused on 
the real estate firms and found that overall, investors 
distinguish the recognized cost and recognized fair value 
of investment property but they do not seem to distinguish 
the fair value of investment property across four countries. 
 In Malaysia, Pappu and Devi (2011) studied the 
relative value relevance of investment property information 
under the cost model and the fair value model. They 
examined 411 listed companies in various industries and 
their results showed that the historical cost model is more 
relevant than the fair value model. Pappu and Devi (2011) 
argued that investors are more comfortable using the cost 
model than the fair value model. Consistent with Pappu 
and Devi (2011), Ishak et al. (2012) provided evidence that 
fair value is not value relevant. They suggested that the fair 
value model is not dissimilar from the cost model. Both 
studies by Pappu and Devi (2011) and Ishak et al. (2012) 
used MFRS 140 Investment Property as a reference.
 The limited numbers of studies on fair value model 
of investment properties provide mixed results. This 
inconsistency may be influenced by the external factor 
such as stage of development in the capital market (So 
and Smith 2009; Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh 2006) or type 
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of industry (Pappu & Devi 2011). The mixed findings of 
previous studies indicate the possibility that other factors 
may influence the value relevance of information on fair 
value. Given previous studies that mainly focus on property 
industry where the use of fair value is not mandatory, we 
on the other hand focus on REIT industry. The focus on REIT 
industry is because the structure and principal activity of 
REIT are different from other industries. REIT has its own 
guidelines, and investment property represents the majority 
of its total assets and directly affects its income. Hence the 
fair value information may be more relevant to investors 
and is expected to be reflected in share price.
 According to the theory of efficient markets, capital 
markets react in an efficient and unbiased manner to all 
publicly available information (Deegan 2010). Basically, 
there are three forms of market efficiency which are weak 
form market efficiency, semi-strong form efficiency and 
strong-form efficiency (Valentine 2010). Weak form market 
efficiency assumes that share prices simply reflect past 
information. Semi-strong form efficiency assumes that a 
firm’s share price reflects all publicly available information. 
Lastly, a strong-form of market efficiency assumes that 
share prices will reflect all information known to anyone 
at the point in time including private information (Deegan 
2010). Findings by Cheah (2005) indicate that the equity 
market in Malaysia is in a semi-strong form efficient. This 
efficiency due to the fact that share prices of firms listed 
in the stock market (Bursa Malaysia) are found to react 
rapidly to all publicly available information. Hence, any 
information disclosed in the annual report is expected 
to be reflected in the share price if the information is 
deemed useful. For a MREIT firm, information on fair 
value revaluation of investment property is required to 
be disclosed in the annual report. If this information is 
important to investors, the share price is predicted to 
response to this information.
 In many prior studies, fair value accounting has been 
argued to be more relevant and useful than historical cost 
accounting (such as Dietrich et al. 2001; Herrmann et al. 
2006). Although the opponents of fair value accounting 
argue that historical cost accounting is more reliable than 
fair value, studies like Dietrich et al. (2001) indicate that 
fair value estimates are more accurate than the historical 
costs. Barth and Clinch (1998) argue that fair values of all 
assets are likely to be relevant to financial statement users. 
Their findings indicate that fair values of different classes 
of assets are significantly associated with the share prices as 
they have implications for firms’ future profitability (Barth 
& Clinch, 1998). Their results are supported by Aboody et 
al. (1999), Courtenay and Cahan (2004) and Hassan and 
Mohd-Saleh (2010).
 Aboody et al. (1999) indicate that revaluations of 
fixed assets among UK firms are positively related to share 
prices. Courtenay and Cahan (2004) extended Aboody et 
al. (1999) study and indicate that revaluations of fixed 
assets are more value relevant for firms with low leverage 
than for firms with high leverage. The most relevant 
study to the current setting is by Hassan and Mohd-Saleh 
(2010). Hassan and Mohd-Saleh (2010) examine the value 
relevance of fair value information among Malaysian 
firms. Their study indicates that fair value information on 
financial instruments is value relevant. Based on the theory 
of efficient markets and the discussions in prior studies, 
we hypothesize that:
H1: There is a positive relationship between fair value of 
investment properties and share prices of MREITs.
VALUE RELEVANCE STUDIES ON                                   
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Beside fair value information, corporate governance 
mechanism also plays an important role in REITs. 
This study examines the value relevance of corporate 
governance mechanisms in MREITs. Despite the fact that 
there are many studies on corporate governance practices 
in various industries (such as Mohd Ghazali 2010; Shakir 
2009; Johari et al. 2008; Mohd Saleh, Mohd Iskandar & 
Rahmat 2005, 2007; Peasnell, Pope & Young 2005, 2007) 
including REITs (Bauer et al. 2010; Han 2006; Hartzell 
et al. 2006; Ghosh & Sirmans 2003; Friday, Sirmans & 
Conover 1999), limited studies examine this issue within 
Malaysian REITs (Pham 2012). 
 Among the above REITs studies, Friday et al. 
(1999), Han (2006) and Bauer et al. (2010) specifically 
examine the effect of corporate governance mechanism 
(i.e. ownership structure) on firm value as measured by 
market to book value ratios and Tobin’s Q. The other 
studies investigate the relationship between corporate 
governance and performance (Bauer et al. 2010: Ghosh 
& Sirmans 2003) as well as investment choices (Hartzell 
et al. 2006). There are also studies that examine the value 
relevance of corporate governance such as by Samontaray 
(2010) and Malik (2012). Samontaray (2010) examines 
the value relevance of corporate governance factors of 50 
listed companies on NIFTY index, India in 2007 and 2008. 
The researcher developed corporate governance scores 
using the guidelines of Narayan Murthu committee report 
on Corporate Governance. Cross-sectional regression 
analysis was used to analyze the relationship between 
share price and corporate governance factors. The results 
indicate that corporate governance had significantly 
affected the share price of the 50 listed companies. Hence, 
Samontaray (2010) concludes that corporate governance 
is an important predictor of a firm’s share price. 
 Similar to Samontaray (2010), Malik (2012) examines 
the relationship between corporate governance score and 
the stock price of 30 companies listed on Karachi Stock 
Exchange (KSE) 30 index in 2009 and 2010. The author 
reports that corporate governance score is significantly 
related to the share price of a firm. Thus, Malik (2012) 
suggests that firms that seek to enhance their stock prices 
should implement governance reforms to gain investors’ 
confidence and reduce firms’ risks. 
 In Malaysia, study on the value relevance of 
corporate governance is limited, especially in MREITs. 
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However, there are studies that examine the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
performance in other industries. These studies include 
Shakir (2009), which examines the effect of corporate 
governance in Malaysian property firm performance 
and Mohd Ghazali (2010), which examines the impact 
of corporate governance on corporate performance of 
non-financial companies. Therefore this study wishes to 
fill the gap by examining the value relevance of board 
characteristics (board independence and CEO duality) in 
MREITs. 
Board Independence and Share Price   According to 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), the separation of ownership 
and control gives rise to the issue of agency costs. In 
a situation where agency relationship exists in which 
the principal (i.e. shareholders) engages the agent 
(i.e. manager) to perform services on their behalf, it 
is assumed that both parties are self-centered and the 
agent will behave opportunistically to maximize his or 
her own wealth (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Conflict of 
interest may also arise between managers and minority 
shareholders. However, the existence of independent 
directors could limit managerial opportunisms and result 
in effective board monitoring (Mohd Ghazali 2010). 
More independent directors on board could enhance 
protection of interests for all shareholders and hence, 
better corporate performance. Therefore companies 
should ensure the existence of external or/non-executive 
directors in their board (Johari et al. 2008). 
 Prior studies provided evidence that external 
directors may prevent firms from managing earnings 
(Peasnell et al. 2005, 2006) and limit big bath activity 
(Mohd Saleh et al. 2005). These findings are consistent 
with Johari et al. (2008). Specifically in REITs study, 
Ghosh & Sirmans (2003) provided evidence that board 
independence improves firm’s performance. We believe 
these consequences might be relevant to investors in their 
decision making, hence will be reflected in the share price 
of the firms. However, contrary to the above, Bauer et 
al. (2010) indicated that corporate governance, including 
board characteristics, is not-significantly related to REITs’ 
firm value (Tobin’s Q). Insignificant result of outside 
board (proxy for board independence) and investment 
behavior was reported in Hartzell et al. (2006). Based 
on the above discussion we hypothesize:
H2: Board independence is systematically related to the 
share prices of MREITs.
CEO Duality and Share Price   The MCCG recommends that 
the positions of chairman and CEO to be held by different 
persons to ensure a balance of power and authority 
(Securities Commission Malaysia 2012). The role of the 
directors is to monitor the top management of a firm. 
Hence, the duality role as chairman and CEO could lead to 
the chairman evaluating his or her own performance. This 
may result in poorer corporate performance. However, 
studies on the role of CEO duality are mainly related to 
earnings management (Johari et al. 2008; Mohd Saleh 
et al. 2005) and REITs performance (Ghosh & Sirmans 
2003). We believe that if CEO duality influenced the firm 
performance and this relationship is fully incorporated 
by the market, then the firm’s share price should quickly 
adjust to the change (Gompers, Ishii & Metrick 2003). 
Based on the above arguments, we hypothesize that:
H3: CEO duality is systematically related to the share prices 
of MREITs.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This study focuses on 12 MREITs that are listed on Bursa 
Malaysia from 2006 to 2011. We exclude four companies 
that are newly listed in the Bursa Malaysia and this lead to 
a total of 59 firm-year observations used in this study. The 
excluded firms are Sunway REIT, CapitaMalls Malaysia 
Trust, Pavilion REIT and IGB REIT. These four firms are 
excluded since these firms are only listed after year 2011. 
There are no data for the firms from 2006 until just before 
they are listed. According to Roscoe (1975), sample size 
of larger than 30 and less than 500 are appropriate for 
most research. The study period starts from 2006 because 
the REITs sector in Malaysia became active in late 2005 
(Newell and Osmadi 2010). The data was collected from 
the annual report of each firm. 
DATA SOURCE AND MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES
Following prior value relevant studies such as Hassan and 
Mohd-Saleh (2010) and Ishak et al. (2012), this study uses 
share price as a dependent variable. The share prices of 
MREITs are obtained from Yahoo!Finance (www.finance.
yahoo.com). This study takes the share price of MREIT 
four month following the closing of each financial year. 
This consideration is taken because Paragraph 9.23(2) of 
Bursa Main Market Listing Requirement requires every 
listed company to announce their annual audited report 
within a period of not more than 4 months from the close 
of the financial year. For example, the financial data of 
annual report ended on 31 December 2009 will be matched 
with the REIT’s share price on 30 April 2010. The use of 
lagged share price ensures that investors have sufficient 
time to acquire annual report information and react to the 
information (Barth, Beaver & Landsman 1996). 
 The independent variables for this study are derived 
from the MREITs’ annual reports downloaded from 
www.bursamalaysia.com. This study only takes into 
account annual reports with 12-month financial data. The 
independent variables for this study consist of financial 
and non-financial data. The financial data include 
book value of net assets per share (NetBV), fair value 
of investment property per share (FVIP), earnings per 
share before revaluation surplus (NetE), and revaluation 
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surplus of investment property per share (RevS). These 
variables are disclosed in the financial statements. Two 
non-financial data are used in this study to represent board 
characteristics. These include board independence (BInd), 
which is measured by ratio of independent directors over 
total board, and CEO duality (Dual) which is measured 
by a dummy variable 1 if CEO and chairman is the same 
person, or 0 for otherwise. The summary of variables and 
the measurements is given in Table 2.
MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODEL
This study aims to examine the value relevance of fair 
value of investment property of MREITs. It adopts Ohlson’s 
valuation model (Ohlson 1995) for constructing the 
regression model to test the hypotheses. The model is 
represented as Equation 1. 
 Pit = α0 + α1BVit + α2Eit + εit   (1)
where:
P =  share price of firm i at time t
BV =  book value of equity per share of firm i at time t
E =  earnings per share of firm i at time t
ε =  error term
 
 In the Ohlson’s model, the book value of equity and 
earnings are the explanatory variables of a firm’s share 
price. To analyse the value relevance of revaluation surplus, 
the study separates ‘book value of equity’ into ‘book value 
of net assets without fair value of investment property’ 
(NetBV) and ‘fair value of investment property’ (FVIP). The 
earnings are also split into ‘earnings before revaluation 
surplus’ (NetE) and ‘revaluation surplus’ (RevS) to see the 
effect of revaluation of investment properties as required 
by the Guidelines on REITs. These separations give rise to 
Equation 2:
 Pit = α0 + α1NetBVit + α2FVIPit + α3NetEit + 
  α4RevSit + εit   (2)
where:
P  = share price of firm i at time t
NetBV =  book value of net assets minus fair value of 
investment properties of firm i at time t (per share)
FVIP  =  fair value of investment property of firm i at time 
t (per share)
NetE =  earnings per share before revaluation surplus of 
firm i at time t (change in FV)
RevS =  Revaluation surplus of investment property of 
firm i at time t (per share)
ε  = error term
 Next, Equation 2 is expanded to include two corporate 
governance mechanisms (board independence and CEO 
duality) and one control variable, REIT’s size (Equation 3). 
Firm size is commonly controlled for in value relevance 
studies (So & Smith 2009).
 Pit = α0 + α1NetBVit + α2FVIPit + α3NetEit +α4RevSit 
  + α5Bindit + α6Dualit + α7Sizeit + εit  
 (3)
where:
P  =  share price of firm i at time t
NetBV = book value of net assets minus fair value of 
investment properties of firm i at time t (per share)
FVIP  = fair value of investment property of firm i at time 
t (per share)
NetE =  earnings per share before revaluation surplus of 
firm i at time t (change in FV)
RevS = Revaluation surplus of investment property of 
firm i at time t (per share)
Bind = Board independence of firm i at time t (ratio of 
independent directors over total board)
Dual = Role duality of firm i at time t (1 if CEO and 
chairman is the same person, 0 for otherwise) 
Size  = Size of firm i at time t (natural log of book value 
of total assets)
ε  = error term
TABLE 2. Variables and measurements
Variable Definition Measurement
P Share price Price of share four months after closing date of financial year
NetBV Book value of net assets Book value of net assets deflated by outstanding share
FVIP Fair value of investment property Fair value of investment property deflated by outstanding sharea
NetE Earnings per share before revaluation 
surplus
Recognized earnings before changes in fair value of investment 
properties deflated by outstanding share.
RevS Revaluation surplus of investment property 
per share
Changes in fair value of investment properties deflated by 
outstanding share
Bind Board independence ratio of independent directors over total board
Dual CEO duality measured by a dummy variable 1 if CEO and chairman is the 
same person, or 0 for otherwise
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RESULTS
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for all the 
dependent and independent variables. The minimum 
book value of net assets excluding the fair value of 
investment property (NetBV) is a negative value because 
investment properties made up a very large portion of 
the total assets of MREITs. Table 3 indicates that our data 
is normally distributed as the median for each variable 
is not significantly different from the mean. Table 4 
presents a bivariate relationship between independent 
variables and share price. Table 4 indicates that three 
of the main variables, i.e. revaluation surplus (RevS), 
Board Independence (Bind) and duality (Dual) are not 
significantly related with share price. This indicates that 
these variables have no influence on firm’s share price. 
Table 4 also presents a Pearson correlation matrix among 
the variables used in this study. It indicates that the 
strongest correlation is between NetBV and FVIP (-0.8576). 
This is followed by the correlation between SP and NetE 
(0.8485) and FVIP and NetE (0.7854). As our sample is 
quite small (59 firm year), the non-parametric approach 
is also employed. 
 Table 4 indicates the Spearman’s Rank Order 
Correlation (in italic) provides consistent findings as 
reported for Pearson correlation. In order to identify the 
problem of multicollinearity, this study also performs 
a collinearity diagnostics test using Tolerance and VIF 
values (Table 5). However this is not a concern since 
only a tolerance value of less than 0.1 and a VIF value of 
more than 10 indicate multicollinearity problem (Pallant, 
2011). Further the two variables are expected to be highly 
correlated because the basic value of the property is the 
same. In addition we also performed a robustness test for 
both main regression models (Equation 2 and 3), where 
variable NetBV is excluded from Equation 2 and 3 because 
of high correlation with FVIP. The results are reported in 
the next section.
MULTIPLE REGRESSION RESULTS
Table 6 presents results of regression analysis for Equation 
2. The regression is performed on a pooled data of 59 
firm-year observations from 2006 to 2011. The equation 
estimates an association between mandatory fair value 
revaluation and share price. The White test shows that 
the model is not subjected to heteroskedasticity problem. 
The result indicates that H1 is partly supported where 
TABLE 3. Descriptive statistics for all variables
n Minimum Maximum Mean Median Standard Deviation
SP
NetBV
FVIP
NetE
RevS
Size
Bind
Dual
59
59
59
59
59
59
59
59
0.6500
-1.2495
0.4196
0.0264
0.0000
11.8453
0.2857
0.0000
2.6800
0.7466
3.6000
0.1706
0.3486
14.3203
1.0000
1.0000
1.1869
-0.5243
1.9038
0.0953
0.0691
13.3476
0.4136
0.1695
1.1300
-0.5543
1.9827
0.0864
0.0225
13.5312
0.4000
0.0000
0.3807
0.4407
0.5960
0.0296
0.0961
0.6916
0.1027
0.3784
TABLE 4. Pearson and Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation coefficients between variables
SP NetBV FVIP NetE RevS Bind Dual Size
SP
NetBV
FVIP
NetE
RevS
Bind
Dual
Size
1.0000
-0.4397**
0.7345**
0.8485**
0.2151
0.0506
-0.1447
0.2455*
-0.4500**
1.0000
-0.8576**
-0.5510**
-0.0748
0.1322
0.1821
-0.3308
0.6825**
-0.8370**
1.0000
0.7854**
0.2203*
-0.1004
-0.2638*
0.2667*
0.8425**
-0.4620**
0.7260**
1.0000
0.2611*
0.0266
-0.1340
0.1999
0.2723*
-0.1555
0.3081*
0.3587**
1.0000
0.2481*
-0.0436
0.1185
0.0395
0.2171
-0.2210
0.1092
0.2515
1.0000
-0.1341
-0.2898*
-0.1566
0.0769
-0.1645
-0.1300
-0.1095
-0.1151
1.0000
0.3480**
0.0865
-0.3333**
0.2408
0.0370
-0.0370
-0.1851
0.3581**
1.0000
** and * indicate correlation is significant at p<0.01 and p<0.05 level respectively. Correlations in italic and bold refer to Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation.
TABLE 5.Tolerance and VIF values for all independent variables
NetBV FVIP NetE RevS Bind Dual Size
Tolerance 0.2030 0.1080 0.3060 0.8050 0.8000 0.7190 0.6580
VIF 4.9320 9.2800 3.2660 1.2420 1.2500 1.3900 1.5190
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fair value of investment property (FVIP) is positive and 
significantly related to share price, but mandatory fair 
value revaluation (RevS) is not significantly related to 
the share price.
 Table 6 also indicates that the book value of net 
assets without fair value of investment property (NetBV), 
and earnings before revaluation surplus (NetE) are 
positive and significantly related to share price. The 
result indicates that investors still regard book value 
of assets and earnings as important factors in making 
their investment decisions. This is consistent with 
Barth, Beaver and Landsman (1998). Our study is also 
consistent with a study by Hassan and Mohd-Saleh (2010) 
in Malaysia where fair value information is found to be 
value relevant for investment decision. However, the 
insignificance of RevS might be due to the fact that it is 
considered as realized by MREITs. Therefore investors 
perceive the information as not relevant for decision 
making. However one of the findings is inconsistent with 
Hassan and Mohd-Saleh (2010) that where the realized 
gains and losses on financial assets was found to be 
significant. We believe the contradictory result is due 
to the options available for firms in determining the fair 
value of investment properties. 
 MFRS 140 identifies three ways to estimate the fair 
value of their investment properties. However, the most 
common method used (Level 3 inputs1) is too subjective 
as the fair value is determine based on the firms estimate 
of discounted future cash flows (MFRS 140, para 46C). 
However, this approach is less reliable as the value is 
not observable from the market (Danbolt & Rees 2008; 
Landsman 2007; Laux & Leuz 2009; Lefebvre et al. 
2009; Penman 2007; Song, Thomas & Yi 2010). Level 
3 inputs require firms to make assumptions about the 
future cash flows associated with the asset and discount 
it using an appropriate discount rate. Therefore, these 
might affect investors’ views on the relevancy and 
reliability of the revaluation surplus (RevS) recognised in 
the comprehensive income statement. Further this could 
probably due to the fact that the REIT industry in Malaysia 
is still at its young age and many investors are not aware 
of REIT investment and cannot respond to the revaluation 
information released by the MREITs (Sarif 2010).
 Table 7 presents a regression analysis for Equation 
3, which includes board independence CEO duality and 
REIT size. The adjusted R2 of this model is 0.7791 which 
is higher than the adjusted R2 of the earlier model in Table 
6 (0.7659). Table 7 indicates similar results as in Table 6, 
where RevS is not significantly related to share price while 
fair value of investment property (FVIP) is significantly 
related to share price. Table 7 also indicates that book 
value of net assets without fair value of investment 
property (NetBV) and earnings before revaluation surplus 
(NetE) remain significantly related to the share price. The 
results on corporate governance factors indicate that board 
independence is positively related to the share price at p 
< 0.05. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is supported. The CEO 
duality however, is not significantly related to share price. 
Hypothesis 3 is therefore not supported and hence rejected. 
Further, our results indicate that REIT size is positive and 
significantly related to share price. The significance of 
board independence indicates that independence of board 
is considered as an important factor by investors as their 
existence will ensure their interest is protected. This is 
consistent with Peasnell et al. (2005, 2006), Mohd Saleh 
et al. (2005) and Johari et al. (2008). Specifically our study 
supports a REITs study by Ghosh and Sirmans (2003). We 
believe that the insignificant result for CEO duality is due 
to the fact that the number of CEO with duality function in 
MREITs is low (17%). 
ROBUSTNESS TESTS
We acknowledge sample size for our study is small. 
Therefore, to ensure our findings are reliable, several 
robustness tests were performed. First, we excluded 
one of highly correlated variables, which is net book 
value (NetBV) as our interest is fair value of investment 
properties (FVIP). This is discussed in the next section. 
Second, we performed a regression analyses for both 
TABLE 6. The association between fair value of investment properties and share price (n59) 
(Pit = α0 + α1NetBVit + α2FVIPit + α3NetEit + α4RevSit + εit)
Variables Coefficient Std Error t-Statistic Prob
NetBV
FVIP
NetE
RevS
Constant
0.4138
0.4542
7.3026
-0.2141
-0.1420
0.1177
0.1169
1.4323
0.2656
0.1101
3.5157
3.8838
5.0984
-0.8061
-1.2896
0.0009*
0.0003*
0.0000*
0.4237
0.2027
R2=0.7820 Adjusted R2 = 0.7659 F-statistic = 48.4388 Prob = 0.000
* indicates significance at p<0.01 
where:
P =  share price of firm i at time t (4 months after financial year end)
NetBV =  book value of net assets minus fair value of investment properties of firm i at time t (per share)
FVIP = fair value of investment property of firm i at time t (per share)
NetE = earnings per share before revaluation surplus of firm i at time t (change in FV)
RevS = Revaluation surplus of investment property of firm i at time t (per share)
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equations 2 and 3 using a winsorized data. Finally we 
performed a non-parametric regression for equations 2 
and 3. These analyses are reported in winsorized data and 
non-parametric analysis. 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSES WITHOUT NetBV
Although Table 4 and Table 5 indicate that multicollinearity 
is not a concern, however due to a high score of correlation 
coefficient between NetBV and FVIP, we therefore exclude 
NetBV from Equation 2. Results for the analyses are 
presented in Table 8. Column 2 indicates that excluding 
NetBV affects our earlier findings as presented in Table 
6. Column 2 (Model 4) indicates that only NetE is value 
relevant. The result is consistent after we include Size 
(which is measured by log of total assets) as a control 
variable (the results are not reported). The significance 
of NetE also remain when both board independent (Bind) 
and CEO duality (Dual) are included (Model 5). Further, 
Model 5 provides evidence that Bind is also marginally 
significant at p<0.10. Therefore, we believe our earlier 
findings reported in Tables 6 and 7 should be read with 
caution as NetBV many have might influenced the results 
as the variable is highly correlated with FVIP. We therefore 
further analyze the sample using winsorized data and 
non-parametric approach. The results are reported in the 
following section.
WINSORIZED DATA AND NON-PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS
We examine normality of residuals for both findings 
reported in Table 6 and 7 based on skewness and kurtosis. 
According to Tabachnik and Fidell (2007), a normally 
distributed variable will have a skewness and kurtosis 
value of zero (0). Results for both analyses indicate the 
skewness of residuals for Tables 6 and 7 are 0.1864 and 
0.4870, respectively. The kurtosis for both Tables 6 and 7 
is 3.5667 and 4.1679. Although the values are within the 
acceptable range, we winsorized our data for both ends (the 
lowest and the highest score) to the forth value to confirm 
our results. We then re-estimate Equations 2 and 3 based 
on the new values. Our findings indicate that earnings per 
share before revaluation surplus (NetE) and fair value of 
investment properties (FVIP) are positively and significantly 
related with share price. For Equation 2 the coefficient 
values for NetE and FVIP are 8.273 (p = 0.00) and 0.224 
(p = 0.054), respectively. Similar results are reported for 
Equation 3 with coefficient values for NetE and FVIP are 
7.799 (p = 0.000) and 0.255 (p = 0.048). These findings 
are consistent with findings reported in Tables 6 and 7. 
 To address the possible bias of small sample size, 
we had performed a non-parametric analysis using rank 
transformed regression. Our results indicate that only NetE 
is significantly related with share price for both Equations 2 
and 3. These findings are not consistent with the parametric 
analyses. Therefore, our findings need to be read with 
caution. Although the sample is small, but according to 
Pallant (2011) it is acceptable for the regression analysis. 
Therefore we believe findings from the parametric analyses 
are more relevant. 
CONCLUSION
In recent years, Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) 
have become an important investment vehicle in 
Malaysia (Newell & Osmadi 2010). Malaysian Real 
Estate Investment Trusts (MREITs) are subjected to the 
Guidelines on REITs issued by the Securities Commission 
Malaysia that require them to revalue their investment 
TABLE 7. The association between fair value of investment properties, board independence, 
CEO duality and share price (n: 59)
Pit = α0 + α1NetBVit + α2FVIPit + α3NetEit + α4RevSit + α5Bindit+ α6Dualit + α7Sizeit + εit
Variables Coefficient Std Error t-Statistic Prob
NetBV
FVIP
NetE
RevS
Bind
Dual
Size
Constant
0.4832
0.5004
6.8096
-0.4052
0.4172
-0.0163
0.0914
-1.5235
0.1394
0.1464
1.6707
0.3018
0.1832
0.0661
0.0373
0.5854
3.4674
3.4169
4.0760
-1.3428
2.2779
-0.2460
2.4508
-2.6024
0.0011*
0.0013*
0.0002*
0.1853
0.0270**
0.8066
0.0177**
0.0121
R2 = 0.8058 Adj. R2 = 0.7791 F-statistic = 30.2258 Prob = 0.000
* and ** indicate significance at p<0.01 and p<0.05 respectively
where: 
P =  share price of firm i at time t (4 months after financial year end)
NetBV =  book value of net assets minus fair value of investment properties of firm i at time t (per share)
FVIP =  fair value of investment property of firm i at time t (per share)
NetE =  earnings per share before revaluation surplus of firm i at time t (change in FV)
RevS =  Revaluation surplus of investment property of firm i at time t (per share)
Bind = Board independence of firm i at time t (ratio of independent directors over total board) 
Dual = Role duality of firm i at time t (1 if CEO and chairman is the same person, 0 for otherwise)
Size = Size of firm i at time t (natural log of book value of total assets)   
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properties at least once every three years. This study 
takes this opportunity to examine the impact of fair value 
on investment properties including its revaluation on the 
share price of MREITs. Besides, the fair value of investment 
properties corporate governance is also a key determinant 
of share price. Hence, this study aims to examine the value 
relevance of fair value of investment properties and its 
revaluation as well as corporate governance mechanism 
in MREITs.
 The results indicate inconsistent findings, where 
insignificant relationship between fair value revaluations (an 
item in profit or loss) made by MREITs and their share prices 
was reported. This finding could probably be due to lack of 
awareness among investors on the effect of unrealized gains 
or losses from changes in the fair value of the investment 
properties (revaluation surplus) on decision making. This is 
because MREITs are still at the infancy stage therefore many 
investors are not aware of REIT investment and therefore they 
cannot respond to the revaluation information released by 
MREITs. Nevertheless, it provides evidence that the fair value 
of investment property (an item in the statement of financial 
position) and board independence are value relevant. This 
study adds to the limited value relevance research that 
examines MREITs. However, it has a limitation. This study 
only focused on the twelve MREITs listed on Bursa Malaysia. 
We acknowledge the small sample size and the limitation 
of generalizing the findings. This however is inevitable 
considering the nature of the industry and the choice of this 
industry is made consciously. The use of fair value is seen 
as more important in REITs. However, most research in fair 
value excludes this industry due to different requirement and 
regulation. Therefore, part of the objectives of this study is 
to fill this gap and REITs is chosen as the focus of the study. 
Future research can extend this study by comparing the REITs 
in Malaysia with its neighboring countries with similar REITs 
industry.
ENDNOTES
1 There are three levels of fair value hierarchy available for 
firms to value their investment properties. Level 1 inputs 
are those based on current price of similar properties in an 
active market. However, Level 1 inputs may be a problem 
in Malaysia as there are limited active markets available. 
Therefore, firms may choose either level 2 or 3 inputs which 
is more subjective. 
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